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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
EvmgNc-DISPUTABLX PMESUMPTrONs; CAN THEY B4 WVGHIED ?-The evi-

dential force of presumptions under the California Civil Code, I96I, was considered and the statute construed in Everett v. Stazdard Accident Insurance
Co., -

Cal. -

, 187 Pac. 996.

The defense to an action on an insurance policy, by one claiming to be
the wife of the insured, was that she did not have that relationship because
the marriage ceremony under which she claimed occurred while the insured
had another wife then living. The question arose as to the effect upon the
determination of this question of fact of the presumption that the deceased
did not commit a crime in consummating the second marriage. The code
provision is as follows: "A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless
so controverted the jury are bound to find according to the presumption."
The code defines a presumption as, "A deduction which the law expressly
directs to be made from particular facts." It is to be noted that these two
provisions were really intended as but statutory declarations of the general
rule of law then existing.
The court construed this statute as requiring the presumption to be
weighed as evidence; that the words of the code, "other evidence," meant
evidence to be weighed against the presumption as evidence. To use the
language of the court in illustrating the principle to be applied, "Thus the
presuifiption of innocence of crime will support a verdict of acquittal in a
criminal case, though no evidence is offered to controvert the case of the
prosecution."
Professor Greenleaf started us on a legal heresy when he made the statement that "This presumption of innocence is to be regarded by the jury, in
every case, as matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the party is entitled."
GMEunNLEAV ON EVIDENCE, § 34. If a court were to instruct a jury to weigh
the presumption of innocence in the defendant's favor, where there was evidence tending to show guilt, what could it possibly mean to a jury or anyone
else? Can the presumption of innocence have one measure of probative value
in one case and a different one in some other case? Has it specific or variable
weight? If a variable weight, what are its variable factors? To weigh it is
to determine its weight, which means that it is likely to have different measures of probative value in different cases. If a juror, on getting an instruction to weigh the presumption, should request the court to explain what it
meant by the instruction, what consideration should determine its weight,
is there any possible thing the court can say in answer? One can attach one
measure of probative value or another to a particular fact, but is it thinkable
that this can be done to the presumption of innocence?
The language of the court quoted above that the presumption of innocence
will support an acquittal without evidence to controvert that of the prosecution means, and only can mean, that unless the prosecution in such a case
'has produced evidence of sufficient probative value to enable the jury to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be acquitted. The presumption of innocence has nothing to do with that conclusion save to make
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NOTE AND COMMENT
it necessary for the prosecution to produce evidence for the jury to weigh if
it would make a case for their consideration at all.
The rule of the presumption under consideration operates only in the
absence of evidence opposed to the required conclusion. Where there is
such opposing evidence the law ceases to demand the conclusion. The presumption must then disappear and the contested fact must be determined
upon the evidence submitted. State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263.
Though the presumption under such circumstances disappears, the facts
to which the presumption attaches still remain in the case. Their natural
probative value is to be considered. Usually that probative value will be
considerable, else the law would not have raised the presumption.
The fallacy of the line of reasoning adopted in the case under discussion
was so clearly pointed out by the late Professor Thayer in his address before
the Yale Law School, with the case of Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432,
as a text, that little can be added. See THAYER'S PRELmINARY EvmEKC AT
THE COMMON LAW, 551. It is interesting to compare Halt v. United States,
218 U. S. 245, 253, with the opinion in. the Coffin case. The court still seems
to be of the same opinion as to what is the law, but thinks it law the jury
will not be likely to understand and: that it is better not to let them try. See
also in this same connection the earlier opinion in Agnew v. United States,
165 U. S. 36, rendered shortly after the publication of the address of Professor Thayer above referred to. Citation to some of the later cases follows.
In accord with the case under discussion, Grantham v. Ordway, Cal.
, 182 Pac. 73; Cowdry's Will, 77 Vt. 359. Contra, Duggan v. Bay State
Ry., 230 Mass. 370 ("The presumption of due care is not itself evidence. It
is a simple rule to which resort is had when there is a failure of evidence;
it is not evidence, but a rule about evidence"); Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn.
535; Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed, 8, 23. A unique doctrine is that
announced in the opinion in Kauffman v. Logan, Iowa, , 174 N. W.
366, where the court says that where there is a conflict in the evidence over
the existence of a particular fact, such as that it is equally balanced between
the parties, that the jury should find the fact established in accordance with
the presumption, if one has been operative in the case. In other words,
assuming that the burden of proof upon the question of whether the fact
exists is upon the party in whose favor the presumption exists, then the jury
should be told that they must find for him, even though it cannot say that
the preponderance of the evidence is with him. A statement which seems to
refute itself.
V. H. L.
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